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Does the Phrase "Convicted inAny Court"
ina Firearms Law
Include Foreign Convictions?
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PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 85--88 © 2004 American Bar Association.
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ISSUE
Does a federal law criminalizing possession of a firearm by anyone "convicted in any court" include convictions entered in foreign countries?
FACTS
On June 2, 1998, Gary Sherwood
Small bought an SWD Cobray ninemillimeter handgun from a firearms
dealer in Pennsylvania. Small filled
out the federal form required for
firearms purchases and answered
-no in response to the question
"Have you ever been convicted in
any court of a crime for which the
judge could have imprisoned you for
more than one year, even if the
judge actually gave you a shorter
sentence?"
In fact, Small had been convicted
on April 14, 1994, in Okinawa,
Japan, of multiple counts of violating Japan's Guns and Knives Control
Law, the Explosives Control Law,
and the Customs Law. Each offense
was punishable by a term of impris-

onment exceeding one year. Small
was sentenced to five years imprisonment and 18 months of parole.
On August 30, 2000, a federal grand
jury in the Western District of
Pennsylvania returned an indictment
against Small for, among other
offenses, being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Small moved
to dismiss the indictment on the
grounds that the language "any
court" in § 922(g)(1) did not include
foreign courts. The district court
denied this motion, and Small
entered a conditional guilty plea
pending the outcome of his appeal.
The district court sentenced Small to
eight months' imprisonment followed
by three years' supervised release.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court. The Third
Circuit concluded that "foreign convictions, generally, can count as
predicate offenses for purposes of §
922." United States v. Small, 333
F.3d 425, 427, n.2 (2003).

(Continited on Page 86)
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UNITED STATES

DocGZT No. 03-750
ARG MENT DATE:
NoVElIBER 3, 2004
FROM: TtHE THIRD CIRCUIT

"Uts

The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari on March 29,
2004.
CASE ANALYSIS
Section 922(g)(1) of Title 18 of the
United States Code provides that
"[i]t shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any
court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year ... to ship or transport in
interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm or ammunition; or to
receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce" (emphasis added). In this
case, the question is whether the
reference to convictions "in any
court" includes convictions entered
in foreign courts.
This case presents a question of
statutory interpretation.
Construction of statutes begins with
the language of the statute itself, as
well as consideration of how the
particular provision fits into the
overall statutory scheme. This initial question seeks to determine
whether the language itself is
ambiguous. If a court determines
the language is unambiguous,
"judicial inquiry is complete."
ConnecticutNat'l Bank v.
Velastegui, 503 U.S. 249, 254
(1992).
Small contends that the term "convicted in any court" does not
include convictions in foreign countries. This argument is based in part
on the jurisdictional references in
other related provisions. For example, in the definitions section, the
term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year" is defined to exclude certain
federal or state offenses "pertaining
to antitrust violations, unfair trade
practices, restraints of trade...." 18

P,

-

U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). Small points
out the anomalous results that
would occur if a pers6n convicted in
the United States for an anti-trust
violation would be permitted to possess a firearm, while another person
convicted of the same offense in
another country would be precluded
under § 922(g) from possessing a
firearm.
Another inconsistency raised by
Small is that subpart 9 of § 922(g)
prohibits a person "who has been
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence"
from possessing a firearm. The definition of this predicate offense refers
specifically to an offense that "is a
misdemeanor under Federal or State
law." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).
I Small argues that interpreting §
922(g)(1) to include a conviction
from any court in the world, while
interpreting § 922(g)(9) to include
only federal or state convictions,
leads to absurd results. A person
convicted of a crime of domestic violence in another country can possess a firearm, while a person convicted of this offense in a state or
federal court is precluded from possessing a firearm. Based on these
examples, Small contends that the
term "convicted in any court" refers
only to convictions in federal and
state courts since Congress could
not have intended the results set
out above.
The United States argues that the
term "any court" is unambiguous,
expansive, and all-inclusive. The
United States points to other cases
in which the Supreme Court has
read such language broadly, noting
the lack of modifiers or other limiting language. See e.g., United States
v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997)
(interpreting the word "any" in 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)). Furthermore,
the other statutory provisions Small
points to illustrate that Congress
chose to limit or specify the cover-

age of the statute in certain
instances, but not in others.
The United States also points to a
parallel provision enacted as part of
the same law as § 922 that specifically covered "any person who has
been convicted by a court of the
and
United States or of a State ...
who possesses any firearm ..." 18

U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1). The United
States contends that in that (subsequently repealed) provision
Congress included language limiting
the types of convictions that could
trigger the provision to convictions
rendered in the United States.
Congress's failure to include such
language in § 922(g) indicates a
congressional intent that § 922(g)
reach all convictions, both foreign
and domestic.
The courts of appeals that have
addressed this issue are divided on
the initial question of whether the
language in § 922(g) is ambiguous.
In 1986, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the language "convicted in
any court" was unambiguous.
United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d
754. More recently, the Third and
Fourth Circuits have agreed with
I this conclusion, finding that the
words "any court" are not ambiguous, and that they are "all-inclusive
in nature." United States v. Atkins,
872 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1989).
By contrast, the Tenth Circuit concluded that foreign convictions
could not be used to impose an
enhanced sentence. United States v.
Concha, 233 F.3d 1249 (2000). In
Concha, the defendant was convicted of violating § 922(g). For purposes of sentencing, the court had to
determine whether three prior foreign convictions could serve to
enhance his sentence under §
924(e)(1), which provides that
when one "has three previous convictions by any court referred to in
section 922(g)(1) of this title for a
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violent felony or a serious drug
offense," he must be imprisoned for
a minimum of 15 years. The court
in Concha relied on the same definition in § 921(a)(20) that excludes
certain federal or state antitrust or
unfair trade practices offenses to
conclude that Congress could not
have intended anomalous results
such as those asserted by Small.
Small and the United States also
disagree about congressional intent
with respect to § 922(g). Small
points to legislative history to support his contention that Congress
did not intend § 922(g) to include
foreign convictions. Specifically,
Small points to the differences
between the Senate and House bills
and the resolution of these differences. The Senate bill included a
definition of the term "felony" that
included "in the case of Federal law,
an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
and, in the case of State law, an
offense determined by the laws of
the State to be a felony." Report No.
1501, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 61
(1968). However, the House bill simply referred to a person "who had
been convicted in any court of a
crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year."
Report 1577, House Committee on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
2-3, 25 (1968). The final version
adopted the language from the
House bill. Small points out that the
Conference Report did not comment on the language in the Senate
bill specifying federal and state
felonies and concludes that this
silence indicates an intent to limit
the scope of § 922(g) to convictions
in federal or state courts.
In United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d
89 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124
S.Ct. 2888 (2004), the Second
Circuit considered this legislative
history and noted that the

Conference Report "voiced no disagreement with the Senate Report's
explicit limitation of felonies to
include only convictions attained in
domestic courts." Id., at 95. The
court in Gayle also noted that the
Conference Report made no mention of foreign convictions serving
as predicate offenses. Id. The court
concluded that the language "convicted in any court" is ambiguous
and, while recognizing that
Congress may want to include some
foreign convictions, stated that
"Congress must speak more clearly"
to accomplish this.
Similarly, the court in Concha concluded that the language in § 922(g)
is ambiguous, justifying the court's
reliance on the rule of lenity (the
doctrine that ambiguous criminal
laws should be interpreted in favor
of the defendant). The circuit courts
that have concluded that the language is unambiguous have
eschewed the rule of lenity. See
Atkins, 872 F.2d at 96 ("if statutory
language is unambiguous, the principle of lenity is inapplicable").
The United States counters that, to
the extent the above legislative history is at all relevant, it indicates
that Congress chose language that
would broaden the scope of § 922(g)
since the definition in the Senate
bill was not ultimately adopted.
Such breadth is consistent with
Congress's intent "to keep guns out
of the hands of those who have
demonstrated that they may not be
trusted to possess a firearm without
becoming a threat to society."
Dickerson v. New Banner Inst.,
Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 (1983).
Small further supports his argument
that Congress could not have
intended to include foreign convictions by pointing out that the broad
reading adopted by the Third,
Fourth, and Sixth Circuits would
encompass convictions from coun-

tries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or
Somalia, whose criminal justice systems do not provide procedures to
ensure protection of fundamental
rights.
The United States counters that §
922(g) focuses on the fact of conviction. In Lewis v. United States, 445
U.S. 55 (1980), the Supreme Court
construed the language "has been
convicted" in § 1202(a)(1), the
statutory parallel to § 922(g), to
include convictions that were subject to collateral attack for potential
constitutional errors. In Lewis the
Court stated that "the focus [is] not
on reliability, but on the mere fact
of conviction ...
in order to keep

firearms away from potentially dangerous persons." 445 U.S. at 67.
Before the district court in the present case, the United States argued
that § 925(c) of Title 18 provides
that a felon may petition the attorney general and request relief from
the disabilities imposed by federal
laws such as § 922(g), and that
Small could have sought relief pursuant to this provision. The district
court quoted the Tenth Circuit in
Concha, that "Congress has prevented any funds from being used
for this mechanism in the appropriations bills every year since 1992."
United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp.
2d 755, 763 n.10, quoting Concha,
233 F.3d at 1255 n.3. The United
States maintains that these subsequent actions by Congress do not
alter the plain and unambiguous
nature of the language "convicted in
any court."
Although Small did not argue in the
Supreme Court that his Japanese
conviction was fundamentally
unfair, he raised this argument in
the lower courts and includes in his
brief details about the Japanese proceedings. He asserts that among
other deficiencies, he did not have a
(Continued on Page 88)
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jury trial, that his attorney was not
present when Small was interrogated for 25 straight days, and that
he was not permitted to appeal
his conviction.
The district court evaluated each of
Small's claims concerning the
Japanese conviction and concluded
that it was "sufficiently consistent
with our concepts of fundamental
fairness." Small, 183 F. Supp.2d
at 770.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case presents the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to clarify
the scope and meaning of the term
"convicted in any court" as applied
to the § 922(g) provision criminalizing firearms possession by ex-felons.
In addition, the Supreme Court's
decision will resolve the split among
the courts of appeals.

ambiguous, it is likely to engage in
an analysis of legislative history to
determine the congressional intent
as to this term. Such an analysis is
likely to encompass the arguments
by the parties and may include the
relevance of Congress's repeated
decisions to prevent any funds from
being used for the mechanism
under § 925(c) that permits
prospective relief from § 922.

ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Gary Sherwood Small (Paul D.
Boas (412) 391-7707)
For the United States (Paul D.

Clement, Acting Solicitor General
(202) 514-2217)

The Court will initially determine
whether the language at issue in §
922(g) is ambiguous and requires
further judicial inquiry as to congressional intent or whether the language is clear and that the term
''any court" means literally any
court. With respect to this initial
evaluation, the Court will likely consider the placement and language of
§ 922(g) in the overall statutory
scheme. If the Court concludes that
the language is unambiguous, then
it will likely conclude that foreign
convictions are included in the term
"convicted in any court."
In any event, the Court might also
address the concern about convictions entered in countries whose
criminal justice systems do not provide the procedural rights guaranteed in the United States. In this
regard, the Court may indicate
whether federal courts should take
such considerations into account.
Otherwise, if the Court concludes
that the language "any court" is
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